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Background
Common law and statute
As with most of the so-called common 
law countries, there are two sources of 
law in New Zealand: judge-made law and 
legislation. Legislation is now the dominant 
source, although it was not always so. In 
earlier times in England, the statute was 
an interloper and the task of the judges 
was to confine its operation by employing 
strict rules of construction. If one looks 
at the New Zealand statute book today – 
and I use that term to include the whole 
body of legislation, including statutes and 
delegated legislation – it will be seen that 
there are few areas it does not touch. 
Much of New Zealand’s business 
and commercial law is statute-based: for 
example, the law relating to companies, 
financial institutions, banking, insurance, 
capital markets and their operation, 
takeovers, personal property securities, 
financial reporting, receiverships, trade 
practices, consumer protection, foreign 
investment and intellectual property. The 
law of contract is a mix of statute and 
judge-made law, the so-called ‘contract 
statutes’1 having reformed and codified 
large areas of what was once common 
law. Our criminal law is entirely statute-
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based. The law of evidence, formerly a 
combination of statute and judge-made 
law, is now codified.2 The statute has 
made inroads into tort law through the 
Injury Prevention, Compensation, and 
Rehabilitation Act 2001, the Defamation 
Act 1992, the Contributory Negligence 
Act 1947 and the Law Reform Acts of 1936 
and 1944. The system for transferring and 
dealing with estates and interests in land 
has been statute-based since 1870. The 
New Zealand economy is dominated by 
the primary sector, so it is not surprising 
that there is a good deal of legislation 
relating to it.3 Significant statutes 
affect education, health, social welfare, 
courts, immigration, the labour market, 
occupational regulation, central and local 
government, the electoral system, revenue 
and transport. Implementation of Treaty 
of Waitangi settlements relies on unique 
and sometimes complex statute law. A 
substantial amount of statute law gives 
effect to New Zealand’s international 
obligations (see Gobbi, 2000). 
There are over 1,900 public acts in 
force and thousands of other legislative 
instruments, including statutory regula-
tions made under the authority of acts of 
parliament. Each year the New Zealand 
parliament enacts over 100 acts and the 
executive makes over 400 regulations. 
While much of this is amending 
legislation, new cognate statutes are 
constantly appearing.
Not surprisingly, the focus of the 
work of the courts has changed. Instead 
of making law, the principal job of the 
courts is to interpret and apply legislation 
(Frankfurter, 1947; Hewson, 1950; Steyn, 
2001; Kirby, 2002; Hailsham, 1983). While 
the courts make law and do so every day, 
for the most part this involves ascertaining 
the meaning of legislation. The resulting 
product has been perceptively described 
by a senior New Zealand judge as 
‘interstitial legislation’.4 
It has been asserted that in the New 
Zealand legal system, statute law is not 
merely king, it is emperor (Palmer, 
2007, p.12). Perhaps the time has come 
to stop calling New Zealand and other 
comparable jurisdictions common law 
countries. Lawyers in particular have 
been slow to recognise the transcendent 
role of legislation in our legal system, a 
reflection possibly of the emphasis placed 
in legal education on case law. 
The importance of having good law
No one would deny the necessity for 
legislation to be of a high standard. 
Legislation originates from the policies 
of elected governments. They decide 
what they want to do. They may 
be persuaded by their advisers to 
legislate in certain areas (sometimes 
disparagingly described as bureaucratic 
or departmental legislation), but for the 
most part governments call the shots. 
Public sector advisers and lawyers play 
a large and important part in turning 
policy into legislation. The knowledge 
and skills required to design and develop 
legislation are acquired through doing 
and are not easily or quickly learned. 
High standards must be achieved. 
There can be no mistakes. Legislation 
cannot be half right or about right. It 
has to be perfect or as close to perfect 
as possible. If it is not consistent with 
legal principle and the values held by a 
modern parliamentary democracy or it 
is unclear, the rule of law comes under 
threat and the faith of society as a whole 
in its laws and the law-making process is 
weakened.
There is no formal training available 
for those who work in the legislative field. 
The Legislation Advisory Committee 
(LAC) guidelines on the process and 
content of legislation, first published in 
1987, remain the only source of guidance 
available to lawyers and policy makers 
engaged in developing legislation. To a 
large extent the guidelines encapsulate 
a lot of esoteric and institutional 
knowledge and practice. 
John Burrows and Ross Carter’s 
excellent work Statute Law in New Zealand 
(Burrows and Carter, 2009) appears to be 
the only New Zealand textbook dealing 
with legislation as a discrete subject, 
and it stops short of attempting to lay 
down standards for good legislation. 
Legislation as a subject is not, and never 
has been, taught in all our law schools. 
It is, however, a popular elective at some. 
Harvard Law School, having pioneered 
the casebook method of teaching law, 
abandoned it in 2006. First-year law 
students at that university now begin their 
legal studies with a compulsory course 
on statutes and statutory interpretation 
(Kirby, 2007). The texts on statutory 
interpretation have a limited focus and 
are not concerned with legislative quality. 
The few texts on law drafting also have a 
specific focus. The position is the same in 
most other jurisdictions. It is surprising 
that matters of such importance receive 
so little attention from governments and 
the academic world. There is a large gap 
in training and resources available to 
assist in producing good quality law. 
Against this background, the work of 
the Regulatory Responsibility Taskforce 
should be seen as a serious and welcome 
initiative. Its proposals for improving 
legislative quality deserve careful and 
principled consideration. 
Does the bill measure up to its principles?
The principles of responsible regulation 
are grouped under six categories: rule of 
law, liberties, taking of property, taxes 
and charges, role of courts and good law 
making.
Rule of law
The first category concerns key elements 
of the rule of law. The first of these is that 
the law should be clear and accessible. At 
the outset, however, the bill’s own title 
raises a question about accessibility. A 
title should be a succinct, general and 
accurate description that conveys to a 
reader what an act is about. An ordinary 
person looking at the title of this bill for 
the first time could be misled into thinking 
[The Bill] says nothing 
about the design of 
sanctions to enforce 
legislative obligations, or 
what matters parliament 
must legislate upon and 
what matters may be 
delegated. 
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the bill deals with something other than 
the quality of legislation. The bill uses the 
word ‘regulatory’ as a grammatical form 
of regulation in the sense commonly 
used by economists. It is, however, about 
legislation and legislative standards. 
Apart from the title and a reference to the 
principles of responsible regulation, the 
word regulation is not used in the bill; 
instead, the conventional term legislation 
is employed. The word ‘responsibility’ is 
an odd choice. The taskforce recognises 
the problems inherent in the title and 
recommends several alternatives. The 
title of this bill does not conform to basic 
standards of clarity and accessibility and 
the recommendations of the taskforce to 
adopt a better one should be supported. 
Even then, a reader might be led to 
think that the bill contains a definitive 
statement of the requirements for 
good legislation. It is not, however, 
comprehensive. It does not expressly 
mandate consistency with a number of 
important statutes, including the Official 
Information Act 1982, the Human Rights 
Act 1993 and the Privacy Act 1993, nor with 
the Treaty of Waitangi and New Zealand’s 
obligations under international law, all 
of which import important values into 
our legislation. It says nothing about the 
design of sanctions to enforce legislative 
obligations, or what matters parliament 
must legislate upon and what matters 
may be delegated. Although the bill is 
careful to state that the principles do not 
limit the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, there may be considerable overlap 
with that act. The principle in clause 7(1)
(b) of the bill that legislation should not 
diminish freedom of choice or action 
might be thought to include some of the 
specific freedoms protected under the Bill 
of Rights. 
The words ‘clear’ and ‘accessible’ lack 
precision in the context in which they are 
used. Are they synonymous? To whom 
must legislation be clear: a specialist in 
the field? a highly intelligent person? 
someone of average intelligence? Is ‘clear’ 
directed at the drafting or the policy, or 
both? Legislation has multiple audiences: 
law makers, users, scholars, judges, and 
administrators. It can be difficult to lay 
down hard-and-fast rules in this regard. 
Much depends on the subject matter. 
In the drafting of legislation there is 
often a tension between principle and 
detail. How much detail is necessary? Too 
much and the measure risks becoming 
cluttered; too little and it risks becoming 
uncertain. It is a difficult balance. Words 
have shades of meaning. Nor is clarity just 
about words: structure and organisation 
of material are important components of 
clarity. The clarity of a piece of legislation 
may be affected by the complexity of 
the policy it seeks to implement: if that 
complexity can be reduced the legislation 
can often become clearer. 
Not everyone likes the emphasis in 
modern legislation on plain language, or 
drafting innovations such as examples, 
purpose and overview clauses, flow-
charts, diagrams and other graphical 
aids. Critics say it is unnecessary clutter, 
adds nothing to an otherwise well-drafted 
provision and gives readers a false sense of 
knowing more than they actually do, and 
that it ‘dumbs down’ the statute. These 
people would say that an act having these 
features is not clear. 
While jurisprudence might be 
developed over time by the courts on 
what ‘clear’ means, I suggest it is too broad 
a concept to pin down and I am not sure 
if judges are best placed to do it. The word 
‘clear’ by itself does not take one very far, 
and a law that leaves wide and uncertain 
scope for judicial development is not a 
good law. If Parliament only ever enacted 
clear and unambiguous law, there would 
be no more cases coming before the courts 
on the interpretation of statutes. Finally, 
it is difficult to conceive of a situation 
where a departure from the requirement 
for legislation to be clear could, under 
the proposed bill, ever be reasonable and 
demonstrably justified. The possibility 
of engaging the justified limitation 
qualification in this context seems odd. It 
would also be highly improbable that the 
minister and the chief executive would 
ever certify under clause 8 of the bill that 
their own bill was not clear. 
This article is about legislation, not 
judge-made law. It might, however, be 
mentioned in passing that judge-made 
law is not always a model of clarity and 
accessibility. Decisions of appellate courts 
that deliver multiple judgments can make 
it extremely difficult even for a lawyer to 
work out what has been decided and why. 
Judges can all arrive at the same result 
but for different reasons. While judges 
do not always speak with a single voice, 
the legislature does. Despite the fact that 
modern-day judgments make sensible use 
of headings and paragraphs, and judges 
attend courses on judgment writing, 
many judgments are too long and often 
discursive, a feature that is in part the 
result of the judicial process of analogous 
reasoning in which a conclusion is reached 
by drawing on the same or similar cases. 
There is no guarantee that a decision of 
a court on whether an act is clear would 
itself be clear on the issue. 
The term ‘accessible’ is not free from 
ambiguity and can have more than one 
meaning. The commentary recognises this. 
It says the word is intended to have three 
meanings: availability in the sense that 
the law should be available in the physical 
sense (where can I get my hands on it?); 
navigable in the sense that users can locate 
the law in the existing body of legislation 
without unnecessary difficulty (where can 
I find what I’m looking for?); clarity in the 
sense that the law is understandable to the 
user (when I’ve found it, will I understand 
it?).5 If the word is to have these meanings, 
perhaps the bill could say so. Except where 
a provision is ambiguous, it should not be 
It is unsafe for a reader 
to read only the principal 
act: amending acts have 
to be looked at to see how 
they affect the principal 
act. Sometimes an act 
that is not described as 
an amending act makes 
amendments to other acts; 
the fact that it does so will 
not be apparent on its face. 
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necessary to look at extrinsic material to 
find out what it means. 
The obligation to make legislation 
physically available goes to the fundamental 
principle of parliamentary democracy 
under the rule of law that in order to know 
their rights and obligations under the law, 
citizens must be able to get hold of it. The 
Acts and Regulations Publication Act 1989 
requires the chief parliamentary counsel 
to make copies of acts and regulations 
available for purchase at a reasonable 
price. There is a similar obligation with 
reprints, which are compilations of acts 
and regulations with their amendments 
incorporated. Acts and regulations both 
as enacted or made and in up-to-date 
form are available free via the internet 
from a database owned and maintained 
by the Crown (www.legislation.govt.nz). 
There is no statutory requirement for 
internet availability. Would legislation be 
accessible under the bill if it were available 
only in electronic form requiring users to 
download it? That is the position in the 
Canadian province of New Brunswick, 
which no longer publishes hard copies of 
statutes or regulations. Does the obligation 
to make legislation accessible require state 
subsidisation? These are just a few of the 
questions that arise when one considers 
the content of the obligation. The fact that 
physical access to legislation is the subject 
of a separate act suggests that the matter is 
rather more complex than merely stating 
that is has to be accessible. 
The law on the same topic is often 
scattered across several statutes. The last 
time a comprehensive subject index of 
New Zealand legislation was published 
was in 1933. The textual method of 
amending legislation results in the 
enactment each year of a great many 
amending acts. It is unsafe for a reader 
to read only the principal act: amending 
acts have to be looked at to see how they 
affect the principal act. Sometimes an act 
that is not described as an amending act 
makes amendments to other acts; the fact 
that it does so will not be apparent on its 
face. Reprints help with the problem of 
navigation, but they don’t overcome it. 
Would the legal obligation in the bill 
to make legislation accessible require the 
state to publish a comprehensive subject 
index and keep it up to date? Would it 
require the state to operate a continuous 
reprinting facility so that reprints of all 
legislation could be accessed, rather than, 
as under the current arrangements, just 
the statutes and regulations for which 
there is the greatest demand? The word 
‘accessible’ takes on new meaning when 
its full implications are considered.
The second rule of law component is the 
principle that the law should not operate 
retrospectively. The requirement in clause 
11 of the bill to prefer an interpretation 
of legislation that is compatible with the 
principles, and the power for a court to 
issue a declaration of incompatibility, 
will not apply to existing legislation for 
ten years. Parliament and the executive 
would be given ten years to get their act 
together; an act or regulation that is not 
made compliant within that period will 
be subject to the interpretative direction 
and to a declaration of incompatibility. 
Despite the ten-year grace period, 
however, there seems to me to be an 
element of retrospectivity involved. There 
is no restrospectivity if existing legislation 
is made compliant, but, if it is not, the bill 
will certainly have retrospective effect and 
it is not a sufficient answer to say there 
is no restrospectivity involved because 
you have been given ten years to get your 
legislative house in order. For reasons 
outlined later in this article, I suggest that 
pulling that off is impossible. It should 
perhaps be commented in this regard that 
while Parliament routinely changes the law 
prospectively, rather than retrospectively, 
the courts seldom, if ever, do.6 
The third rule of law component is the 
principle that everyone is equal before the 
law. The commentary explains this as an 
entitlement to equality of treatment in the 
administration of the law, as opposed to 
substantive equality. It refers to the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia 
that ‘equality under the law’ and ‘equality 
before the law’ are different concepts. In 
his seminal work Constitutional Law of 
Canada, Peter Hogg says the language 
of section 15 of the Canadian Charter, 
which states that every individual is ‘equal 
before and under the law’, was deliberately 
designed to abrogate a suggestion by a 
judge in Lavell7 that review on equality 
grounds under the Canadian Bill of Rights 
did not extend to the substance of the law 
but only to the way it was administered 
(Hogg, 1992, p.1159). In rights-based 
legislation, subtle distinctions abound. It 
will not be immediately obvious to all that 
the distinction between substantive and 
administrative equality is intended by the 
bill, and it may require an authoritative 
decision from a court to determine the 
scope of the principle. The point could 
be made clear by stating these limits 
explicitly.
The fourth rule of law component 
is the principle that issues of legal right 
and liability should be resolved by the 
application of law, rather than the exercise 
of administrative discretion. A vast number 
of statutes authorise decision making 
by ministers, officials and public bodies. 
Some set out detailed decision-making 
parameters, while others are less specific 
or are silent. Administrative decisions 
made under an act that does not specify 
criteria can never be exercised on arbitrary 
or subjective grounds. Decisions must be 
made in good faith, for a proper purpose 
and in accordance with the objectives of 
the act. It is a basic rule of administrative 
law that a decision maker cannot take into 
account irrelevant considerations. 
The principle in the bill seems unduly 
open-ended and uncertain, requiring, as 
it appears to do, every statute that confers 
administrative decision-making powers 
to specify criteria for their exercise. How 
comprehensive must the criteria be? Even 
though the commentary appears to accept 
It is an accepted legal 
principle that it is the  
right of a sovereign  
state to determine its 
immigration policy  
from time to time as  
it sees fit. It may be as 
arbitrary as it likes. 
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that, despite detailed prescription of rules 
and standards about the exercise of an 
administrative power, some discretion 
might be required, the principle itself 
would seem to preclude this. Discretion 
is necessary in decision making to ensure 
decisions are made fairly, and to avoid the 
harsh consequences that can result from 
strict adherence to prescribed criteria. 
Many administrative decisions involve a 
balancing of different factors, with more 
weight given to some than to others. 
Administrative decision making is not 
an exact science involving the formulaic 
application of predetermined criteria to a 
given set of facts. 
The Immigration Act 2009 contains 
numerous provisions for granting 
different classes of visas. To take one 
example, residence-class visas are 
required to be made by the minster or an 
immigration officer in accordance with 
residence instructions (see section 72). 
However, the minister can in his or her 
absolute discretion grant a residence-class 
visa as an exception to those instructions. 
Conditions may be imposed when a visa 
is granted, whether or not they are part 
of the immigration instructions applying 
at the time, and additional conditions 
can be imposed after grant whether or 
not they are specified in the immigration 
instructions (see section 50). It is an 
accepted legal principle that it is the 
right of a sovereign state to determine its 
immigration policy from time to time as 
it sees fit. It may be as arbitrary as it likes. 
Immigration instructions are statements 
of government policy and are a legitimate 
reflection of this principle (see section 
22(8)). The matters that may be provided 
for in immigration instructions are very 
broad (see section 22). Would a decision 
by the minister to issue instructions 
under these powers involve the exercise 
of administrative discretion and thus 
infringe the principle in the bill? 
Sections 16 and 17 of the Overseas 
Investment Act 2006 set out criteria 
that must be considered by the relevant 
minister or ministers in deciding whether 
to grant consent to an overseas investment 
in sensitive land. Section 17(1)(c) states 
that in assessing whether the investment 
will or is likely to benefit New Zealand, 
they must consider various factors. The 
factors are stated in broad terms: for 
example, whether the investment will 
result in added market competition, 
greater efficiency or productivity, or 
enhanced domestic services. They may 
also determine what weight to give these 
factors. Is this unacceptable administrative 
discretion under the bill? 
In my view, it is not good law making 
for legislation to be put at risk of challenge 
merely because it confers on an office 
holder or entity power to make decisions 
on a basis that involves the exercise of 
discretion. The principle, like others, is 
expressed at too high a level of abstraction 
to be workable. 
Liberties
The second category of principle concerns 
liberty. Legislation should not diminish 
a person’s liberty, personal security, 
freedom of choice or action, or rights to 
own, use and dispose of property, except 
as is necessary to provide for, or protect, 
any such liberty, freedom or right of 
another person. There is, however, a subtle 
difference in the language of the principle 
in the bill and the way it is commonly 
expressed. 
The passages in Bennion on Statutory 
Interpretation (Bennion, 2003, pp.784, 
846) relied on in the commentary do 
not, as I read them, support a general 
freedom of choice principle. Bennion is 
an attempt to set out, in the form of a 
code comprising 464 sections in 30 parts 
arranged in 7 divisions and running 
to nearly 1,500 pages, a series of rules, 
principles, presumptions and canons for 
interpreting legislation. Division four is 
headed ‘Interpretive principles derived 
from legal policy’. It asserts that the rules 
and principles of construction are derived 
from legal policy. Section 263 defines the 
nature of legal policy. Bennion’s starting 
point is that the content of public policy 
and therefore legal policy is what a court 
thinks and says. A court may be guided 
by an act of parliament as indicating 
parliament’s view of public policy and 
that ultimately parliament’s view must 
prevail. 
The principle underpins Bennion’s 
code and is the basis for the rules, 
principles, presumptions and canons that 
form part of it. They need to be understood 
in this light, and particularly in relation to 
the bill. It is, however, a flawed view of the 
functions of the legislature and courts. 
The idea that the content of public policy 
and legal policy is what a court says it is 
cannot be regarded as tenable in a modern 
parliamentary democracy. It is little more 
than an attempt to preserve the once-held 
view that the judges’ role in law making 
is paramount and that a law made by an 
elected legislature or by the executive in the 
exercise of a delegated law making power 
is only a law because the courts recognise 
it as such. It is completely at odds with the 
modern-day view that parliament makes 
the law and the judges interpret and apply 
it. 
Section 263 and its definition of the 
nature of legal policy is followed by 
various categories of legal policy, one of 
which is the prohibition of restraints, 
which is explained as ‘legal policy worked 
out by the judiciary [that] has tended to 
frown on restraints placed on freedom 
by private persons’. Passages from four 
judgments are quoted in support. 
Three of these cases are relics of an era 
when judges saw themselves as bastions 
against the predations of unprincipled 
and unwelcome statutes. They no longer 
reflect reality. The fourth does not provide 
authority for the proposition in the text. 
None of the cases support a general 
freedom of choice principle. I would 
venture to suggest that there is not a single 
decision of an English or New Zealand 
court that does. 
Section 278 of Bennion’s code is 
also relied on in the commentary as 
supporting a freedom of choice principle. 
Section 278 asserts that property or other 
... parliament does 
not intend to override 
fundamental rights unless 
it does so expressly or by 
necessary implication  
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economic interests should not be taken 
away, impaired or endangered by state 
power except under clear authority. That 
is altogether different from a general 
freedom of choice principle, or a principle 
that a limitation on the right to own, use 
or dispose of property is justified only to 
provide for or protect the right or freedom 
of someone else. 
The commentary also relies on 
Burrows and Carter’s Statute Law in 
New Zealand (Burrows and Carter, 2009, 
pp.322-3) to support the principle against 
imposing limits on the right to own, use 
or dispose of property. What these authors 
say, however, is subtly different. What they 
say is that, whereas once the courts were 
most protective of property rights, this 
has understandably diminished in the 
area of planning and land use, but even 
today courts will not adopt a construction 
that takes away property rights more than 
the act and its proper purpose require. In 
other words, it is a matter of construction 
of the statute. 
The commentary is much closer to 
the mark when it refers to the principle 
of law that parliament does not intend to 
override fundamental rights unless it does 
so expressly or by necessary implication, 
and cites text writers including Bennion 
and Burrows and Carter, and Blanchard for 
the New Zealand Supreme Court in Cropp 
v Judicial Committee8 This is more in line 
with the modern-day understanding and 
more usual formulation of the principle. 
Legislative intent to do any of these things 
must, to adopt Blanchard’s words, be 
‘clearly spelt out’. In Secretary of State for 
the Home Department ex parte Simms,9 
Lord Hoffmann said that what is meant 
by the principle of legality is that the 
legislature must squarely confront what 
it is doing and accept the political cost: 
fundamental rights cannot be abrogated 
by general or ambiguous words. 
The principles stated in the bill are 
overstatements that alter the thrust of the 
legality principle that the clearest language 
is required by parliament to abrogate 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Nor is it 
about limitations necessary only to protect 
others; it is about the need for parliament 
to use the clearest language if it wishes to 
derogate. The point in its simplest terms 
is that the liberty principle as expressed 
in the bill is not recognised by English 
law: what is recognised is that in the 
interpretation of legislation, clear words 
are needed to interfere with fundamental 
rights. They are different things. 
There is great danger in attempting, as 
the bill does, to package up into a single 
statutory statement a raft of common law 
presumptions and rules which the courts 
use in different contexts all the time. Care 
and precision are required in stating a 
principle of this kind. Overstatement 
or misstatement may have serious 
consequences. It is true that fundamental 
rights cannot be abrogated unless 
parliament uses clear and unmistakable 
language. By the same token, those 
fundamental rights should be stated in 
plain and unmistakable language and 
their content made clear to legislators so 
that parliament knows exactly what the 
rights are that it might be infringing. The 
bill fails to do this.
Taking of property
The third category of principle is that 
legislation should not take or impair 
or authorise the taking or impairment 
of property without the consent of the 
owner, unless it is in the public interest and 
full compensation is paid by the person 
who benefits. The commentary refers to 
protections in other countries against the 
taking of property, notably in the United 
States and Australia. 
The case law on the meaning of 
taking in the United States is voluminous. 
Originally, the concept of taking was 
thought to apply only to physical 
appropriation, but since its adoption 
in 1791 it has undergone enormous 
development. By 1905, for example, it was 
used to invalidate legislation of the state 
of New York limiting to 60 the hours that 
could be worked in a bakery on the basis 
that the state’s power did not authorise the 
shifting of resources from employers to 
employees simply because the legislature 
disagreed with the existing distribution 
of wealth, although it could do so for 
health and safety considerations.10 The 
effect of the decision initially was to 
place boundaries around labour laws and 
prevent organised labour from obtaining 
redistributive legislation (Tushnet, 2009, 
pp.26-7). Taking may arise from physical 
damage to property that impairs its use. 
It may occur to intangible property where 
the owner had a reasonable investment-
backed expectation that the property 
would not be used by the state and the 
expectation is impaired. 
Nowak and Rotunda describe the 
development of the law on takings by 
the United States Supreme Court in the 
following terms:
Rather than develop a single framework 
to define a taking, the Supreme 
Court, much to the consternation 
of commentators, has retained to 
some extent both the theories of 
Holmes and Harlan. In its decisions 
on property use regulations and the 
extent of permissible government 
impairment of the value of private 
property interests the Court has 
issued rulings which follow no clear 
theoretical guidelines. The Supreme 
Court’s decisions on ‘taking’ issues 
may properly be viewed as a ‘crazy 
quilt pattern’ of rulings. (Nowak and 
Rotunda, 1991, p.430) 
There have been numerous decisions 
on the circumstances in which zoning 
regulation and landmark zoning can 
amount to taking; the circumstances in 
which physical occupation and limitations 
on an owner’s right to exclude access or 
occupation by others can be a taking; 
whether utility rate regulation can be a 
taking; what kind of emergency action 
will amount to taking (could the state of 
Virginia destroy ornamental red cedar trees 
that risked infecting neighbouring apple 
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trees: answer, yes);11 and the circumstances 
in which impairment of use of property 
may constitute taking. There is also a vast 
amount of constitutional law-writing on 
the subject. 
Following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kelo v New London, which 
upheld eminent domain for economic 
development purposes as a public use 
under a Connecticut statute, a number 
of the states have passed their own 
legislation relating to the exercise of the 
takings power. The legislation restricts 
the use of eminent domain for economic 
development purposes, enhancing tax 
revenue or transferring private property 
to another private entity, defining what 
constitutes public use and establishing 
criteria for designating blighted areas 
subject to eminent domain. The legislation 
also defines exceptions. 
The legal landscape in the United States 
with respect to takings is highly complex 
and involves consideration of a unique 
and often overlapping mix of federal and 
state constitutional law. It could hardly be 
described as clear. We should be extremely 
wary of importing a body of law from 
another jurisdiction without knowing 
precisely what it is or where it might lead. 
Section 51 (xxxi) of the Australian 
Constitution was adapted with significant 
modification from the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. The 
latter is stated as a limitation on power, 
while the former is expressed as a grant 
of power: the Commonwealth may make 
laws with respect to the acquisition of 
property on just terms from any state or 
person for any purpose for which it has 
power to make laws. Unsurprisingly, there 
is also extensive case law and academic 
commentary on section 51(xxxi), reflecting 
decades of experience. It has been held to 
render invalid a Commonwealth statute 
preventing a landowner from carrying out 
mining operations within 1,000 metres of 
the surface of the Kakadu National Park, 
although the statute did not totally prevent 
mining. It has been held to invalidate a 
Commonwealth statute that required 
actions for damages for personal injuries 
by seafarers to be commenced within six 
months of the commencement of another 
statute which, in bringing in a statutory 
compensation scheme, removed the right 
to bring common law actions for damages 
for personal injury. One need only read 
the masterly summary of the applicable 
principles in the judgment of Kirby to 
realise that the issues are complex and that 
there are no clear answers.12
It would be unwise to enact a law which 
prohibits in the most general language 
the taking or impairment of property, 
leaving it up to the courts to define its 
parameters by reference to the law in 
some other jurisdiction or to embark on 
a jurisprudential development mission of 
their own. Many of the American states 
have tried to concretise the generality 
of taking in their own constitutions and 
through amendments. If New Zealand 
is to go down the path of providing 
a constitutional-type protection for 
property rights, then we should at the 
very least codify its essential components 
so that state, citizen and the courts know 
what is involved.
Taxes and charges
The fourth principle is that taxation 
must be imposed or authorised by act of 
parliament and that charges for goods and 
services must be reasonable in relation to 
the benefits that may be obtained from the 
goods or services provided and the costs 
of providing them. There is little to say 
about this except to observe that as regards 
tax, the principle is already enshrined in 
section 22 of the Constitution Act 1986, 
and as regards charging of goods and 
services the principles are well established 
and hardly need legislative endorsement. 
Indeed, stating the principle in these brief 
and general terms obscures the fact that 
there is a considerable science involved 
in determining what is reasonable and 
whether a charge bears a proper relation 
to the goods or services provided. 
Role of courts
The fifth principle, under the category 
‘the role of the courts’, has two elements. 
The first is that legislation must preserve 
the role of the courts in authoritatively 
determining the meaning of legislation. 
The second is that legislation should 
provide for a merits appeal against 
decisions made by ministers, public entities 
and officials to a court or independent 
tribunal, and should state criteria. 
The first is a well-established principle: 
parliament makes the law and the courts 
say what it means. It does, however, 
raise some interesting questions. How 
would binding rulings under the Tax 
Administration Act 1994 be affected? 
The regime doubtless exists to provide 
certainty in business arrangements from 
a tax perspective, and in that regard 
it reflects the principle that the law 
should be predictable and certain. If the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue makes 
a private ruling or a product ruling and 
it is applied in relation to an arrangement 
in the way stated in the ruling, the 
commissioner must apply the taxation 
law to the person and the arrangement in 
accordance with the ruling. Do binding 
rulings constitute determinations of the 
meaning of tax legislation, or do they 
operate merely as an estoppel? 
The second element draws on material 
covered in detail in the Legislation 
Advisory Committee guidelines. The 
guidelines are not intended to lay down 
absolutes. They identify several relevant 
considerations that should be taken into 
account in addressing issues about appeal 
structures. Firstly, there is no common law 
right of appeal, and natural justice does 
not require an appeal from every decision. 
Second, a general availability of appeals is 
at odds with finality of decision making. 
Third, the value of an appeal has to be 
balanced against factors such as cost delay 
and the significance of the subject matter. 
Fourth, a right of appeal may not be 
justified where the primary decision maker 
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is a body of high quality and expertise: 
in such cases a limited appeal confined 
to questions of law may be appropriate. 
Fifth, the higher the policy or political 
content of a decision, the less justiciable 
it becomes and the less appropriate it 
is to provide for a merits appeal. The 
importance of these considerations is 
obscured by the unqualified language in 
which the principle is expressed in the bill: 
there is rather more to the issue than the 
principle implies. 
Proponents of the bill might say that it 
is not the purpose of the bill to preclude 
sensible exceptions and that objections 
to the generality of the principles are 
met, as they are with the Bill of Rights, 
by the justified limitation qualification. 
The problem with that response, however, 
is that it treats the enterprise of law 
making as an exercise involving a series of 
rebuttable presumptions quite unsuited 
to the resolution of complex policy and 
resource allocation issues. 
Vast numbers of statutes and 
regulations confer power on ministers, 
public entities and officials to make 
decisions; many do not provide for merits 
appeals. There is no merits appeal against 
a decision to issue a search warrant. 
The Search and Surveillance Powers Bill 
currently before parliament provides for 
search warrants to be issued by issuing 
officers, but there will be no right of 
appeal. Search warrants are issued every 
day. The process would collapse if there 
was a right of appeal on the merits to a 
court or tribunal. Statutes that confer 
exemption powers on ministers and 
public entities do not provide for merits 
appeals. There is no merits appeal against 
a decision of the Reserve Bank to refuse 
an application for bank registration or to 
cancel registration once granted. Neither 
the Overseas Investment Act 2006 nor the 
regulations provide for merits appeals. 
Lots of appeals are subject to a leave filter: 
it is not clear how they would fare under 
the bill. 
Good law making
The final category of principles relates 
to good law making. The bill expressly 
precludes a court making a declaration 
of incompatibility in relation to these 
principles except as regards the duty to 
consult (see clause 12), on the basis that 
the issues are not suitable for judicial 
consideration because of the institutional 
limits of the adversarial process. While 
that may be so as far as declarations of 
incompatibility go, the fact is that the 
principles themselves are not entirely 
non-justiciable under the bill. Clause 11 
requires a court to prefer an interpretation 
of an enactment that is compatible with 
the principles over any other meaning, 
and the principles of good law making are 
no exception. They will still be engaged 
by the courts in their interpretation 
function and receive the same judicial 
consideration the bill appears to regard as 
inappropriate. 
The first principle requires consultation 
with persons likely to be affected by the 
proposed legislation. It might be thought 
overly broad. Statutory obligations 
to consult are commonly limited to 
requiring consultation with persons 
or organisations or representatives of 
persons or organisations rather than with 
everyone. How does the principle relate 
to the obligation of the Crown as a Treaty 
partner to consult with Mäori? 
The second principle requires careful 
consideration to be given in developing 
legislation to a variety of matters, including 
the effectiveness of existing legislation 
and the common law, whether the public 
interest requires legislation at all, other 
options (including non-legislative ones), 
who will benefit and who will suffer, and 
possible adverse consequences. 
Some of the principles of responsible 
regulation which the bill states are 
themselves little more than restatements 
of existing legislation and the common 
law. The Interpretation Act provides that 
legislation does not have retrospective 
effect; the Bill of Rights Act protects 
freedoms which the bill also seeks to 
protect; the Constitution Act provides that 
taxes cannot be imposed or authorised 
except by statute; and the common law 
has long recognised the role of the courts 
in making authoritative interpretations 
of legislation. In this regard, the bill 
appears to trip over itself and it is no 
excuse to say that the principles are the 
same only expressed differently. They deal 
fundamentally with the same issues. This 
kind of overlap would not be tolerated in 
other statutes.
Does the public interest require 
that the issue be addressed? I confess to 
considerable unease whenever the words 
‘public interest’ appear in legislation. It is a 
concept of uncertain scope. I have seldom 
if ever employed the term in legislation I 
have drafted because it has always seemed 
an easy way out of saying what one means 
and merely subcontracting the problem to 
someone else, usually the courts. 
Is the state of the New Zealand statute 
book such that a law is required to say that 
it must be clear and accessible? Are there 
sufficient examples of legislation having 
seriously adverse retrospective effect to 
justify another statutory enactment of the 
principle against retrospectivity? Indeed, 
are there any? Are there examples of 
arbitrary or subjective decision making 
that require a law that issues of legal right 
and liability be resolved by application of 
the law and not administrative discretion? 
Are the protections under the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights so inadequate that 
further legislation is required to protect 
aspects of liberty? The commentary does 
not make a compelling case that the state 
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of New Zealand’s law and its law-making 
institutions is so deficient that legislative 
intervention is essential. 
The bill would require careful 
evaluation of other options that are 
reasonably available. The commentary 
suggests that unless the guiding principles 
in the bill, including the LAC guidelines, 
are backed by meaningful consequences, 
they are unlikely to achieve significant 
adherence. The commentary does 
not, however, consider alternatives to 
legislation. Even if it were assumed that 
there is less than adequate adherence 
to the standards of good legislation, it 
does not follow that a statute is the only 
way forward. There are several possible 
alternatives that should be seriously 
evaluated. 
The LAC does a good job with limited 
resources. It relies heavily on the time of 
its busy members and the contributions 
they are able to make alongside their 
other commitments. The members 
are senior practising and government 
lawyers, law commissioners, sitting and 
retired judges and economists. Apart from 
producing and updating the guidelines 
and providing limited educative support 
for them, the LAC’s involvement tends to 
occur after bills are introduced rather than 
in the design and development stages. As a 
result, its impact on the finished product 
is often limited. Its interventions can be 
too late. 
The Legislation Design Committee 
(LDC) was set up in 2006 to provide advice 
in developing legislative proposals.13 The 
idea is that departments can engage with 
the LDC early on in the process and seek 
its input into the best ways to implement 
a particular policy. The LDC is concerned 
with things like design issues, instrument 
choice and the coherence of the statute 
book. Like the LAC, it relies heavily on the 
individual contributions of members and 
its advisers. 
The LDC can be effective and some 
of its engagements have resulted in 
resolution of difficult issues and better 
legislation. It is a place to which policy 
advisers and lawyers can go and ask 
questions such as: ‘can we do this?’; ‘this 
is new territory for us, how should we 
go about it?’; ‘are we on the right track?’ 
The LDC meets infrequently and usually 
only when there is a request for assistance. 
There is, however, a degree of confusion 
about the overlapping roles of the LAC 
and the LDC. 
Combining the LAC and LDC into 
a single body (a Legislation Standards 
Committee?) with pre- and post-legislative 
scrutiny functions and adequate resources 
to carry them out could provide a highly 
effective institutional mechanism for 
ensuring proper legislative standards are 
met. It could have a certifying function, 
which would arguably be preferable to the 
certifying role envisaged by the bill, where 
the promoters of a proposed bill are in 
effect required to say that they have done 
a good job. It could also be required to 
report to parliament through a minister on 
compliance with legislative standards. The 
taskforce has recommended establishing a 
permanent group responsible for reviewing 
existing and proposed legislation against 
the principles of responsible regulation 
and guidelines that would be issued by 
a minister. What I am suggesting is not 
dissimilar. 
Another option is to mandate the 
adoption of an equivalent to the generic 
tax policy process which has been used 
since 1994 in developing tax policy. The 
process was formalised to ensure effective 
tax policy development through early 
consideration of key policy elements 
such as revenue implications, compliance 
and administrative costs, and economic 
and social objectives. It brings external 
consultation into policy development and 
helps understanding of the rationale that 
underlies it. It also brings transparency 
into the process. A key feature is that draft 
legislation can be included in discussion 
documents.14 
A further option is a well-supported 
ministerial office with responsibility for 
the promotion of good legislation. Similar 
institutional arrangements exist in New 
South Wales, which has a minister for 
regulatory reform and a Better Regulations 
Office in the Department of the Premier 
and Cabinet. Such mechanisms or variants 
of them could usefully be examined before 
recourse to legislation as the panacea. 
Another of the good law-making 
principles is that legislation must be the 
most effective, efficient and proportionate 
response. In this regard, I consider that 
the proposal fails in the area of problem 
definition. It is not clear from the 
commentary that the problems with New 
Zealand legislation are such that the bill 
is needed to fix them. Apart from a few 
instances the taskforce cites as examples 
of bad law making, there is nothing to 
indicate where the problems lie or what 
they are. A careful and comprehensive 
analysis of the state of the statute book 
should be required to establish that the 
enactment of the bill is necessary. 
Clause 16 of the bill requires all public 
entities to use their best endeavours to 
review the legislation they administer 
for compatibility and report both the 
steps taken and the outcomes. As already 
noted, there is a ten-year grace period to 
get existing legislation into shape before 
the courts can pronounce it incompatible. 
The bill is not confined to statutes and 
regulations. It applies also to legislative 
instruments: that is, rules, orders in 
council, bylaws, proclamations, notices, 
warrants, determinations, authorisations, 
and other documents that determine the 
law or alter the content of the law and that 
directly or indirectly affect privileges or 
interests, impose obligations, create rights 
or vary or remove obligations or rights. 
I doubt if anyone has come up with a 
number for instruments of this kind, but 
a conservative guess would put it in the 
thousands. 
Reviewing such a body of legislation 
for compatibility would be a massive 
undertaking. Take the Income Tax Act 
2007 as an example. The act is the result 
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of a project to rewrite the Income Tax 
Act 1976 in plain language. The job was 
done in two stages. The first stage began 
in the early 1990s with the enactment of 
the Income Tax Act 1994, a reorganised 
version of the 1976 act. The second stage 
was not completed until the enactment of 
the rewritten statute in 2007. The object 
was to produce a tax statute in clear and 
accessible language without changing 
tax policy. A few policy changes were 
necessary and they are identified, but in 
essence the rewrite was just that, a rewrite 
not a reform. If account is taken of the 
1994 Act, the process has taken over 15 
years to complete. 
Imagine a similar process for all 
legislation. Not only would it have to 
be decided whether a particular act, 
regulation or instrument needed rewriting 
to make it clear, it would be necessary to 
evaluate it against all the other principles 
in the Regulatory Responsibility Bill. 
Many of our principal statutes and 
regulations have been so extensively and 
frequently amended that they bear little 
resemblance to the original: they have 
lost their coherence. They are drafted in a 
mix of different styles reflecting their age. 
Many of these acts and regulations are 
referred to every day by lawyers and non-
lawyers alike. They would not pass the test 
of clarity and accessibility. Rewriting them 
just to make them clear and accessible 
would be a massive job. It would be 
impossible to avoid making policy 
changes. There are not the resources to do 
it. Parliament would have to re-enact the 
statutes and might want to reconsider and 
debate the original policy. The executive 
would have to remake the regulations and 
other instruments. Is this a proportionate 
response? 
The principle of limited liability is 
a central feature of legislation about 
companies. The principle is that the 
liability of the shareholders in the 
liquidation of a company is limited to 
the amount unpaid on their shares. 
A company and its shareholders are 
separate legal persons and a shareholder 
is not liable for the debts of the company 
except to the limit of their unpaid capital. 
This principle has been around for a long 
time. It is seen as serving an important 
economic and social objective in providing 
for the aggregation of capital for business 
purposes. What it means, however, is 
that shareholders can effectively protect 
themselves from liability to creditors and 
in tort for the acts and omissions of the 
business venture they have formed. Does 
this not diminish the freedom of action 
that would otherwise be available to 
another person to seek redress for a wrong 
committed by the shareholders were they 
to carry on business in unincorporated 
form, for example as partners or in an 
unincorporated joint venture? 
It would seem heretical in this day 
and age to question company limited 
liability. Professor John Smillie has, 
however, argued that there are significant 
issues with the concept. Limited liability 
can be seen as shifting the costs of risk-
taking in a manner that is morally 
indefensible and violates the fundamental 
principle of equality before the law (a 
key principle the bill seeks to protect); it 
was originally conceived as desirable to 
provide perpetual succession; it was never 
clear that limited liability was necessary 
to promote industrial development; 
economists are divided about the merits 
of the concept; it provides undesirable 
incentives for shareholders and managers 
to take risks with other people’s money; 
it is questionable whether the vehicle 
is necessary to raise capital by public 
subscription, since few companies raise 
capital by public share offers (Smillie, 2008, 
p.133). While a reassessment of corporate 
liability would be seen as threatening the 
foundations of business, it seems to me 
that the bill requires it. 
The insider trading laws prohibit the 
use that may be made of information 
that is price sensitive. Insider trading 
is a criminal offence under provisions 
in the Securities Markets Act 1988, as it 
is in some overseas jurisdictions. The 
legislation effectively restricts the use a 
person may make of information that may 
have been acquired through ownership 
of a controlling interest in a company 
or through board representation. If 
the information is property, does the 
legislation diminish the person’s right 
to use it? Is the requirement to make a 
takeover offer under the takeover code 
for additional shares in a company once 
a threshold has been reached a restriction 
on the ownership of property? Is the 
obligation to disclose under the Securities 
Markets Act an interest in a listed company 
a restriction on the ownership of shares 
that constitute or give rise to the interest? 
It would be impossible to rewrite and 
re-enact all legislation just to make it 
clear and accessible, let alone rewrite and 
re-enact it to make it compliant with the 
principles.
Some related observations 
Changing the approach to interpreting 
legislation 
If enacted, the bill will materially 
alter the approach of the courts to 
the interpretation of legislation. That 
approach is set out in precise terms in 
section 5(1) of the Interpretation Act 
1999. The section requires the court to 
ascertain the meaning of legislation from 
its text in the light of its purpose. Text 
is constrained by purpose and purpose 
is constrained by text. The courts are 
required to look at the text without being 
limited to it, thus avoiding overly literal 
constructions. At the same time they must 
look at the purpose of an enactment, but 
not so as to get carried away by taking 
account of factors of marginal or no 
relevance, speculating, or substituting 
their own views. The provision achieves a 
nice balance. 
The section is, however, no more 
than a statutory statement of what had 
become by the time it was enacted a 
well-established legal principle. The early 
New Zealand interpretation ordinances 
and statutes required our courts to 
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interpret legislation purposively, but the 
courts did not always do so. Instead, they 
applied rules, principles, presumptions 
and canons. Through the latter part of 
the last century the courts moved away 
from a rigid, rule-based approach to a 
purposive approach. They still refer to 
rules, principles and presumptions, and 
to the occasional canon, but these are 
now regarded more as indicative than 
determinative.
The bill would force a return to rules, 
principles, presumptions and canons; 
to the kind of approach advocated by 
Bennion. It would be at odds with the 
principle that underlies section 5 and 
which drives the work of the judiciary 
of the modern era. The bill would force 
a seismic shift away from the purposive 
approach to interpretation. It is not the 
function of courts to pass judgment about 
the integrity and quality of legislation. 
Instead of interpreting legislation as part 
of the process of resolving disputes, the 
courts would now have to evaluate it. 
Increased litigation
The bill enlarges the scope for challenging 
legislation in the courts, making an 
increase in the amount of litigation 
inevitable. Cases involving challenge to 
a statute or other legislative instrument 
on the grounds of incompatibility may 
be expensive to run, adding to the cost of 
litigation for both citizen and the state. 
A new role for the courts
The courts are reluctant to venture 
into matters falling within the area of 
legislative competence. In Arthur J S Hall 
v Simons Lord Hoffmann spoke of the 
sensitivity needed on the part of judges 
in entering into areas of law which are 
properly matters for democratic decision, 
and referred to his earlier judgment in 
Southwark London BC v Mills, in which 
he said that in a field such as housing 
law, which is very much a matter for the 
allocation of resources in accordance with 
democratically determined priorities, the 
development of the common law should 
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not get out of step with legislative policy.15 
If enacted, the bill is likely to require the 
courts to make decisions on matters that 
involve policy choices and to bring them 
much closer to areas of political and 
legislative competence. It is no accident 
that the Bill of Rights Act confers no power 
to make declarations of inconsistency. 
That would have been incompatible with 
a proper appreciation of the role courts 
play in modern society. 
Political and other realities
The bill takes no account of political, 
governmental and parliamentary realities. 
The three-year parliamentary term is 
not particularly conducive to good law 
making. It creates perverse incentives 
in which compromising standards 
is sometimes a price of democracy. 
Governments have agendas and promises 
on which to deliver. Timing becomes 
critical. Political deadlines and lack of time 
are constant enemies of good law making. 
Pressure on scarce parliamentary time is 
another factor. Bills undergo extensive 
change during the parliamentary process 
to a far greater degree than in many other 
legislatures. The problems of continuous 
redesign are well understood by those who 
draft the law and by some of their advisers, 
but not, one suspects, by many others. 
MMP has made correction of legislative 
error more difficult than it used to be. 
These are all features of New Zealand’s 
parliamentary system of government that 
conspire against the enactment of perfect 
laws. Fundamental change to the system 
might result in better laws. What is certain 
is that this bill will not.
Conclusions
The bill falls short of complying with 
many of its own principles. Its use of open-
textured language leads to uncertainty of 
meaning. It attempts to define good law 
making by reference to a set of simple 
principles: in doing so it obscures the 
complexities inherent in them and creates 
the same lack of clarity and uncertainty 
that it seeks to prevent. Legislating is a 
complex business. The bill suggests it is 
not. The bill suffers from an acute lack of 
problem definition and does not properly 
identify and assess workable alternatives. 
Without massive additional resources, it 
would be impossible to make all existing 
legislation compliant with the principles 
in the bill within ten years: the time frame 
is unrealistic and unachievable. The bill 
is a disproportionate and inappropriate 
response to the issue it seeks to redress. 
The bill overlaps with existing 
legislation, restating provisions of current 
statutes in subtly different ways, and in 
doing so risks creating uncertainty and 
confusion. It is inevitable that the bill would 
alter the way legislation is interpreted, 
forcing a return to a methodology long 
ago abandoned by the courts in favour 
of an approach that explicitly recognises 
the paramount role of the legislature in a 
modern parliamentary democracy. There 
is a failure to recognise the impact that 
the short parliamentary term and other 
features of the political and parliamentary 
system have on law making. 
The bill will bring the courts into 
areas of law making that are not within 
their province and for which they lack 
institutional competence, requiring 
them to adjudicate on choices made by 
democratically-elected governments on 
complex social and economic issues and 
the allocation of resources. It will redefine 
the relationship between the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches of 
government and risks damaging the 
comity between them that is critical to a 
stable society. 
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